The text on SID generation requirements is moved to a new normative section
4.1.3 as follows:
4.1.3. SID Selection
The fact that SIDs index routing state (see Section 4.2.1 below)
means that there are requirements for how they are selected.
Specifically, signalling applications MUST choose SIDs so that they
are cryptographically random, and SHOULD NOT use several SIDs for the
same flow, to avoid additional load from routing state maintenance.
Guidance on secure randomness generation can be found in [32].
and section 8.7 is extended with new text on how GIST security depends on
correct action by the NSLP, reading in part:
Certain security aspects of GIST operation depend on signalling
application behaviour: a poorly implemented or compromised NSLP could
degrade GIST security. However, the degradation would only affect
GIST handling of the NSLP's own signalling traffic or overall
resource usage at the node where the weakness occurred, and
implementation weakness or compromise could have just as great an
effect within the NSLP itself. The relevant aspects of NSLP
behaviour are as follows:
o GIST depends on NSLPs to choose SIDs appropriately
(Section 4.1.3). If NSLPs choose non-random SIDs this makes off-
path attacks based on SID guessing easier to carry out. NSLPs can
also leak information in structured SIDs, but they could leak
similar information in the NLSP payload data anyway.
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